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WHAT IS SAFETY DATA?
Julia Pounds
Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service, Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, DC
Paul Krois
NextGen Human Factors Division, Federal Aviation Administration (Retired)
Washington, DC
This paper reports on our efforts to determine if the ubiquitous term safety data
can be more specifically defined. That is, whether data can be categorized as
safety data based on some unique characteristics such that other data not having
these would be categorized as not safety data. FAA analysts rely on multiple
sources of objective data for virtually all analyses supporting FAA’s decision 
making.  While profuse amounts of data are continuously collected twenty-four
hours a day, only subsets are deemed useful for any particular purpose, such as
assessing how well an organization conducts its safety or efficiency or security
missions on a day-to-day or long-term basis. Therefore, safety data appears to be 
defined by whether it is used for safety activities, i.e., surveillance, compliance 
and verification.  Conversely, data used exclusively for security and efficiency
assessments could be defined as not safety data.  We concluded that safety data 
are generally defined a posteriori by how the data are used rather than due to any
intrinsic characteristics.
The Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOV) monitors the Air Traffic Organization
(ATO) using, in part, reports of ATO safety occurrences/data and, in turn, AOV shares safety
data with ATO (FAA, 2006).  The AOV order lists examples but does not specify what safety
data are and are not.
Safety data has become such a ubiquitous term across safety studies that we questioned 
whether using this expression is essentially just a general convenience or whether it is actually
being used as a specific construct in aviation as well as in other industries.  Having well-defined 
data for analysis is the sine qua non - the gold standard - for safety professionals in the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and other industries around the world. 
Researchers of all stripes learn early the need to define their work so that it is not open to 
nultiple interpretations; that is, to clearly define their constructs, methods, and data in terms of
measurable and observable properties with operational definitions.  Unambiguous and 
measurable data are essential for accurately identifying performance indicators, risk indicators,
thresholds, tolerances, and so forth.  Unambiguous results better support decision makers’
interpretations. If the definition is determined by the industry using it, definitions of safety data
would be expected to vary across different industries.  
As practitioners striving to solve applied problems, we depend on clear and specific
constructs and methods to reduce variability in our analyses. Otherwise, how would a researcher
determine unambiguously what data were safety-related and useful for safety analyses versus
“not safety data” that could be disregarded. Perhaps all data used for safety analyses are defined
as “safety data.” In that case, the term is merely a convenience.
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According to the Miriam-Webster Dictionary online, safety is defined as the condition of
being safe from undergoing or causing hurt, injury, or loss, which implies that it pertains to
people, places, and things that can be hurt, injured, or lost. Perhaps data are labeled safety 
data if results of analyses are intended for protection of these entities. We collected some 
high-reliability industry examples to explore these hypotheses. 
Nuclear Power Industry
The nuclear power industry uses safety data in its analyses and reports focusing on 
authorized activities and fundamental problems or hazards related to them, such as unintended 
conditions or events and radiological releases.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is 
responsible for regulation and its policies governing nuclear reactor safety relative to commercial
use of nuclear materials.  As an ultra-high reliability industry, safety data are developed by safety
inspectors, reactor operators, equipment vendors, research laboratories, and other sources.  Data 
and methods can include incident and investigation reports, probabilistic fast-time simulation
models, equipment inspections, human-in-the-loop simulations, reactor operator training data,
surveys, and evaluation checklists (NRC, 2018). 
The NRC previously maintained a human factors information system reports database.  
The database provided annual summaries for each commercial reactor of human performance
issues identified in Licensee Event Reports, inspection reports, and licensed operator
examination reports.  The information was a general overview of the types and approximate
numbers of human performance issues documented in reports by either the NRC or licensees. 
Other industry analyses focus on the industry’s security and safeguards, which are linked
but are also defined uniquely.  Security analyses focus on intentional misuse to cause harm from
external threats to materials or facilities.  Safeguards analyses focus on unauthorized activities
related to acquisition of materials and equipment or development of nuclear weapons. 
The nuclear industry measures for safety, security, and power production tend to be
independent of one another.  Conceivably, undesirable occurrences in any of these categories
might adversely influence  persons, places, or things.  If so, the idea of safety might be 
applicable to security and safeguards of people, places, or things.  Testing this logic leads to the
idea that safety data could pertain to all of these: authorized activities, materials/facilities, and
unauthorized activities.  However, the soundness of this idea is a bit strained and no instances of
this industry using safety data for analyzing facility security, for example, was discovered during
this activity.
Chemical Industry
Chemical safety involves a broad number of industries.  These industries involve toxic
chemical handling (e.g., chlorine and ammonia), hazards of combustible dust, reactive
chemicals, oil and gas production, and hot work activities (e.g., welding).  The Chemical Safety
Board (CSB) has reponsibility to investigate significant chemical incidents and hazards and 
advocate for the implementation of recommendations to protect workers, the public, and the
environment (CSB, 2017).  The CSB mission has a cross-cutting relationship with federal and 
state regulations, industry standards, and other local policies and procedures.  The CSB’s focus is 
primarily on specific accidents and incidents especially those involving loss of life and injury. 
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As part of its work, the CSB may collect data to identify and analyze existing industry
hazards and conduct broad safety studies of such hazards to examine commonalities among
significant incidents and draw attention to key lessons learned.  Their analysis can identify direct 
and proximate causes of equipment failures, underlying systemic and organizational causes such 
as inadequacies in corporate or facility-level safety management systems and organizational
culture, and opportunities to improve operational practices, regulatory standards, and 
enforcement.  The CSB issues safety recommendations to a variety of recipients, including
Federal and state regulatory agencies, companies, industry and labor organizations, standard-
setting bodies, and emergency responders.
An example of a CSB investigation was the West Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion
(CSB, 2013).  The accident involved 15 fatalities and more than 260 individuals injured from the
fire and detonation of fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate. The CSB report used data from
multiple sources to assess contributing and causal factors.  The report organized key safety 
findings as technical, regulatory, insurance, emergency response, emergency planning, and land 
use planning.  Underlying many of these findings were the people involved in various roles, 
making decisions based on information available at that time, at varying points in time prior to
the accident for which there could not have been any line of sight leading up to the accident such 
as a prescient warning.
Software Acquisition
Safety-critical software must meet both system specifications and safety-critical 
performance requirements.  At the FAA, development of software is determined through policy
in the Acquistion Management System (AMS) (FAA, 2019).  The objectives of the AMS are to 
increase the quality, reduce the time, manage the risk, and minimize the cost of delivering safe 
and secure services to the aviation community and flying public.  Data to support these
objectives are collected across the acquisition life cycle, including an Operational Safety
Assessment and Preliminary Hazard Analysis. Guidance for collecting human factors and
human performance data during acquisition of safety-critical software is provided in the Safety
Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions (SRMGSA) (FAA, 2018).  Safety data are 
also obtained by operational testing of software prior to its implementation.  Controllers and 
maintenance experts use representative operational scenarios to validate that the software is an
effective and suitable design solution that meets operational needs (FAA, 2019). 
Safety issues may also be identified after deployment in the field through post 
implementation reviews.  These reviews provide an everyday operational perspective beyond 
what can be accomplished in a testing laboratory environment.  Reviews can also draw on 
security, efficiency, environmental (e.g., noise abatement), and other important parameters and 
data sources as part of identifying and mitigating potential safety issues.
The FAA applies a safety risk management process to all acquisitions that impact the 
NAS. From development to operational deployment, data are important in determining whether
an acquisition supports service that is at least as safe as what is currently being used.  The
addition of functionality through automation and procedures augments safety by providing more
effective and efficient service. Data would be used to validate no decrease to safety while some 





       
               
     
       
     
  





   
 
          
      
            
 
 
            
    
       
        
     
 
       
 
            
   
         
       
 
    
 
         
        
          
          
 
Aviation
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) published the 2017-2019 Global
Aviation Safety Program which defined safety data as:
A defined set of facts or set of safety values collected from various aviation related
sources, which is used to maintain or improve safety.  Note. Such safety data is collected
from proactive or reactive safety-related activities, including but not limited to: a)
accident or incident investigations; b) safety reporting; c) continuing airworthiness 
reporting; d) operational performance monitoring; e) inspections, audits, surveys; or f)
safety studies and reviews.
FAA
The continuing mission of the FAA is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace
system in the world.  FAA established the national policy for safety management (FAA, 2016)
which defines safety as the state in which the risk of harm to persons or property damage is
acceptable.
Aviation has many stakeholder groups, the most important being the flying public.  Each 
group monitors and improves safety levels in their areas of responsibility: commercial carrier
companies, aircraft manufacturers, air traffic service delivery providers, and so forth.  All depend 
on safety data collected by various means and from a variety of sources, pertaining to avoiding
adverse outcomes.
Continuous improvements in aviation technologies, procedures, etc., have led to a level
of safety such that accidents have become very rare events compared to traffic levels. To
accomplish this, the FAA relies on multiple data sources to assess and monitor its programs, 
initiatives, plans and strategic goals.
The FAA collects and stores large amounts of data from real-time operations.  However, 
FAA published system performance indicators that identified only three types as ATO safety
metrics:  number of runway incursions and surface incidents and en route losses of standard 
separation (FAA, 2018). 
It’s reasonable then to assume that the safety data label could apply to all types of
aviation data, given that the goal is avoiding unsafe conditions and outcomes for its stakeholders.  
Here safety may be the primary use but with categories collected for other uses, similar to the
nuclear industry, such as equipment outages, personnel training results, voluntary reporting 
systems, and oversight activities.  Defining data primarily used for safety versus, for example,
effeciency is helpful for several reasons, including, specificity of terms, support for efforts to
standardize and harmonize data-based safety oversight tools and methods, and reducing
conflicting interpretations by stakeholders.  
AOV 
The FAA Administrator established AOV in 2004 (FAA, 2006) making AOV responsible
for independent oversight of the ATO.  The order directs AOV to use safety data to fulfill its
mission and responsibilities and gives examples of data types. The order also makes ATO 
responsible to collect, track, and analyze safety data, and to report safety data to AOV upon 
request. Examples identified include: ATC incident and accident rates, NAS equipment




     
 
      
        
   
     
  
    
      
   
 
      
   
                
     
    
       
  
  
   
     
     
      
 
          
    
           
    
        
         
     
         
  
     




from ATO internal oversight, evaluation, and quality assurance programs.  Collected from 
different types of ATO operations, these data may contribute to the three FAA reported safety
metrics.
In 2011 Press undertook to operationally define ATO safety data as it might pertain to
AOV activities, e.g., surveillance, compliance and verification. In 2004 Press had advised that
any definition should prevent multiple interpretations.  For example, it must be representational, 
unique, and meaningful of the target. He identified several challenges and prescribed solutions
based on the idea that safety data cannot be defined without also including its ulterior use.  
ATO
The ATO performance indicators published by the FAA characterized air traffic 
operations (2018) and included three to indicate the safety of the NAS based on number of
runway incursions and losses of airborne separation.  The metrics for runway incursions were
limited to the Core 30 Airports showing counts from Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 through 2017.  
Incursions were categorized by type of incident.  The Loss of Standard Separation Count was
shown for en route centers from FY 2013 through 2017. 
Other categories of data could potentially intersect to influence safety and thus could be
used in safety analyses and so also considered as safety data. For example, the report also
includes numbers representing system efficiency, such as NAS delays, diversions, go-arounds, 
and cancellations, and numbers from traffic management initiatives, such as those used to 
manage traffic volume, excess demand and airport acceptance rates. As part of research on 
human performance in provision of air traffic services, Cardosi & Yost (2000) reported using
safety data in a study of controller and pilot errors.  They used incident and accident reports from
ATO operations, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), and the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB).
In 2013 Kimble proposed to improve integration of ATO safety-related data. Examples
listed included: ATC operational data from automated NAS systems;  ATC personnel data, e.g., 
training, certifications, and proficiency; voluntary safety reporting programs; radar, voice, and 
facility communications data; weather; and facility logs (ATO, 2013).
Discussion
After considering how the term safety data was used in these high-reliability industries, it 
seems that the the common denominator is safe human performance but the industry’s goals and 
respnsibilities seem to determine whether data related to safety is the primary goal, an equivalent
goal or a secondary concern.  For example, a business would use one set of data to track 
workplace safety and another set to evaluate product safety.  The goal of analysis would 
determine which data are used as primary, equivalent, and secondary safety data rather than 
safety data vs. not safety data.  
So, is safety data a ubiquitous term, an unnecessary term, or a useful term? Certainly, its 
use is pervasive.  It’s short, to the point, and satisfying in a sentence.  Synonyms seem more 
clumsy, wordy or redundant, e.g., well-being, secure, safe-keeping.  The answer to the question:
“What is not safety data?” seems to be that it depends on the industry, the industry’s production 






           
  
 
       
 
     
        
    
      
    
   
  
 
    
 
      
  






   
        




    
  
        
  
Disclaimer
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the 
Federal Aviation Administration.
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